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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003736

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SUBJECT: MALIKI'S ADVISORS PRESSED ON DE-BA'ATH, EXPRESS  
DOUBT ABOUT HASHIMI

Classified By: Pol Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Sadiq Rikabi and Gorges Bakous, both advisors to PM Maliki, met with Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq Ambassador David Satterfield, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan Brett McGurk, and Political Counselor Matthew Tueller on November 12th. In the meeting Satterfield emphasized the importance of seeing progress on De-Ba'athification reform legislation and warned that POTUS expected prompt action. Rikabi asked for U.S. advice on how to move the legislation and expressed doubts over the intentions of VP Hashimi. He confirmed Maliki's support for a U.S.-Iraq partnership declaration but worried about a possible public backlash. Both sides agreed that the Anbar model needed to be replicated elsewhere in Iraq and that a key to its success was transitioning members of Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) groups to other employment opportunities.

Must See Progress on De-Ba'athification  
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¶2. (C) Satterfield opened the meeting by emphasizing the importance of seeing progress on De-Ba'athification reform legislation by November 14th. He explained that the U.S. does not understand why 10 weeks had passed since the August 26 "Leaders' Declaration" and no concrete action had been taken on any of the legislative issues - including De-Ba'ath reform - upon which ostensible formal agreement had been reached. The Prime Minister's constantly shifting explanation of why the "Leader's Draft" of the De-Ba'ath reform had not yet moved to the Council of Representatives (COR) and questions about the support of other participants in the August 26 Declaration did not build USG confidence. Action to move the correct "Leaders' draft" to the COR needed to take place immediately - whether through the Council of Ministers or, as now appeared most expeditious and practical, from the Presidency Council. Waiting for the COR to act to vote down the present De-Ba'ath draft now before it (draft A) was not a viable option. If the new draft does not reach the COR "we will not accept the excuse that the COR didn't cancel the law," regardless of draft A's status, noted Satterfield. Rikabi promised to speak to the PM on the issue and asked for U.S. guidance on how best to move the legislation to the COR. Both parties ultimately agreed the best solution is for the leader's draft to come from the Presidency Council.

Concerns about Hashimi  
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¶3. (C) Rikabi was eager to talk about VP Tariq al-Hashimi and repeatedly expressed doubt over Hashimi's intentions towards the Iraqi government. "We don't understand his position," he said, "is he in the government or would he like to stop everything?" He complained about Hashimi's vetoes of COR legislation, including the Japanese loan package, and compared Hashimi's use of vetoes to the actions of the Soviet

Union on the UN Security Council during the Cold War. Bakous said most of the failure attributed to the government was actually the fault of Hashimi and worried that Hashimi was planning to withdraw from government entirely. Satterfield said he was meeting Hashimi that evening and promised to call Rikabi to give his impressions afterwards. (Note: Al-Hasimi told Ambassadors Crocker and Satterfield that he "strongly supported" the Presidency Council taking immediate action to send the "Leaders' Draft" of De-Ba'ath reform to the COR. End Note.)

#### Strategic Partnership Declaration

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14. (C) Rikabi said the PM's office and the U.S. were "identical" on the draft U.S.-Iraq partnership declaration. However, he warned that the PM would face condemnation from the public for signing the document. "He will be crucified," added Bakous. Both advisors said to guard against backlash the document needed the support of the Presidency Council. Satterfield asked about the technical details of the signing ceremony and recommended it occur during the November 20th DVC with POTUS.

#### Baqubah failures and Anbar successes

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15. (C) Satterfield said the Anbar model needs to be replicated elsewhere in Iraq, adding that "it is an important example of success but we need to see successes in more difficult areas". What worked for Anbar appears to be failing in Diyala. Discussing his recent visit to Baqubah, he said the Provincial Council is ineffective, its Concerned Local Citizens groups face infiltration by militants, and the

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role of the Diyala Support Committee is unhelpful. Rikabi said he agreed "100%" the Anbar model needed to be replicated but emphasized the differences between Anbar and Diyala. He said the Anbar tribes want to participate in the political process and urge their sons to join the Iraqi Army, while the tribes in Diyala do not respect the central government and have not disbanded their militias. Rikabi explained that Maliki wants to ask local people to nominate individuals for the CLC and stop dealing with armed groups that do not recognize the national government. Satterfield mentioned the existence of a prohibition against locally hiring police officers in Diyala, saying new police officers were all Shi'a and brought in from outside the governorate. Rikabi expressed surprise over the prohibition and agreed the sectarian composition of the police force should match the local population. Satterfield emphasized the importance of transitioning from the CLCs through integrating members into the Iraqi forces and providing government assistance for job creation. Rikabi responded that the PM agrees and the only remaining question is how to implement the transition.

#### Confusion over ministers, amnesty

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16. (C) Asked about whether Tawafuq's ministers would be replaced, Rikabi said it was illegal for the ministers to abandon their ministries and complained the PM kept receiving contradictory messages over whether they would return. Satterfield also asked Rikabi about any plans to offer a general amnesty, saying it was an important initiative that the U.S. would support. Rikabi said he had no specific information on any draft amnesty law but promised to follow-up on the issue.

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